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1.　Introduction.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an introduction to Failure Mode and 
Efects Analysis (FMEA), a method for reducing risk and improving the quality 
of products and processes. The paper is organized as folows:
1.　Introduction
2.　The Two Most Common FMEAs
The design FMEA
The process FMEA
3.　Other Common FMEAs
The system FMEA
The service FMEA
4.　Some Innovative Applications of the FMEA Process
For assessing outsourcing risk
For minimizing medical errors by optimizing the design of a new 
hospital
For preventing medical accidents
For aiding preventive maintenance of equipment
As a project risk management tool
5.　Summary and Conclusion
FMEA, in its essence, is a tool for reducing risk. In this case the risk can take 
on various meanings; for example the risk of a product or process causing 
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serious bodily harm (even death), the risk of losing customers when a product 
fails to meet their expectations, the risk of a company losing its reputation for 
good quality, etc.
According to Omdahl’s Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability 
Dictionary (1988), FMEA is:
A systematic method used to indentify and document potential design and 
process related failure modes1), in order to assess the overal risk of each 
potential failure and to identify and implement necessary corrective actions 
that help prevent potential failures from occuring.
According to Litle (2010) FMEA was first used on Lockheed’s P-80 
development program. The P-80 was a jet fighter that was developed in the 
mid-40s and, according to Wikipedia, it was “… the first jet fighter used 
operationaly by the United States Army Air Forces, and saw extensive combat 
in Korea with the United States Air Force as the F-80.”
Subsequently FMEA became popular with NASA during the Apolo program 
and by the 1980s was adopted by the automotive “Big Three.” It is now 
considered a valuable tool for any industry.
In general a FMEA is appropriate whenever an organization plans to develop 
a new product or process, or to significantly modify one. Logicaly it makes 
sense to do a FMEA as early as possible in the design phase of the new/modified 
product or process. This is true since the longer one waits to identify a potential 
failure mode in the product/process the more it wil cost to remedy it should 
such a failure actualy occur. Therefore, the FMEA would likely be conducted 
somewhere around the early development stage once the concept has been wel 
established. Idealy by this time engineering drawings and even a prototype are 
available for the FMEA team’s use in the case of a design/product FMEA. For a 
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 1)　A failure mode is simply the way in which a product component or process step 
could fail to perform its intended function.
process FMEA, a process flowchart should exist.
Once it is decided to carry out a FMEA, it can be broken down into three 
phases: assembling a team, conducting the FMEA, and folow-up actions based 
on the FMEA. According to McDermot et al. (2009) the “team is usualy four 
to six people, but the minimum number of people wil be dictated by the 
number of areas that are afected by the FMEA” (p. 11). For example a FEMA 
could afect engineering, manufacturing, quality, maintenance, R&D, etc. and 
representatives from those areas should be on the team.
There is no definite criterion for the team leader—simply the person best 
suited to run the FMEA. This implies that he or she should be wel versed in the 
FMEA process. A key member of the team wil be the design/product engineer 
for the design FMEA and the process engineer for the process FMEA. 
McDermot et al. caution that this person, usualy having a lot invested in the 
product or process, may tend to inhibit eforts of the team to find fault with it. 
This could be especialy important should this person be the leader. For this 
reason management may wish to appoint someone else with less personal 
interest in the product/process as the team leader.
An important document for clarifying the duties of the team is something 
McDermot et al. cal a “FMEA Team Start-up Worksheet.” Essentialy a 
charter, this document states exactly what product/process the team is to conduct 
the FMEA on, who the team members are, what resources are available to the 
team (including its budget), when and to whom it reports, etc.
As for conducting the FMEA, it is a fairly standardized process that is based 
on completion of a form. By methodicaly completing the form the team wil: 
document each potential failure mode, its efects, the estimated severity of each 
efect, the likely cause of the failure, any existing prevention/detection controls, 
and the estimated likelihood of the failure mode occurring and being detected. 
Figure 1 (folowing) is a typical design FMEA form.
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As for folow-up actions, the form also provides places to: list actions 
recommended by the team to eliminate the failure or at least mitigate its risk, 
who wil be responsible and a target completion date for each recommended 
action, the action taken, and a reassessment of the severity, prevention, and 
detection ratings.
2. The two most common FMEAs
A FMEA can be conducted on any organizational activity that affects the 
customer and this includes internal customers too. However the two most 
common FMEAs are the design FMEA, which analyzes the design of a product, 
and the process FMEA, which analyzes some process—usualy a process for 
manufacturing something.
The design FMEA. As mentioned, to conduct a FMEA a team is assembled 
and a form is completed. It is important that the scope of the FMEA be wel 
speled out. McDermot et al. give this example for a new cofeemaker:
[The FMEA wil be] on the new RS-100 cofeemaker and the glass carafe 
for that coffeemaker. The FMEA wil not include any parts of the 
cofeemaker that are common to other cofeemakers in our product line, 
such as the electronic clock, the electrical cord and wiring into the 
cofeemaker, and the gold cone cofee filter (p. 16).
To further define the scope certain questions should be asked such as who’s 
the customer (the user), how wil the product be used and possibly misused, wil 
the FMEA include consideration of product packaging, storage, and transit, etc.
Once assembled the first step is for the team to familiarize itself with the 
product. Here the product/design engineer wil play a key role. This wil help 
the team decide what to place in the first column of the (Figure 1) FMEA form: 
“Component or Subassembly.” As quoted in Litle (2010, p. 13) a component is 
defined as “One level below the level of the part, subassembly, assembly, etc. 
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for which the FMEA is being performed.” 2) This implies that the FMEA could 
be performed on something as smal as a connector or as large as an automobile. 
For example, if the FMEA were being conducted on a connector (a part) it’s 
components might be the connector’s housing and the connector’s contacts. 
And, if it makes more sense, the FMEA could be at the “subassembly” or higher 
level. At the “subassembly” level a component would likely be a “part” and at 
the “assembly” level, a “subassembly,” etc. so strictly speaking the title for 
column #1 in Figure 1 should read simply “COMPONENT.”
As the team decides on each component, a brief statement of its function is 
writen in column #2 of the FMEA form. Drawing on an example in McDermot 
et al., if the product is a new fire extinguisher and one of the components is the 
hose, its function could be writen as “delivers extinguishing agent.” Figure 1 wil 
be used to ilustrate this example and shows these entries for columns #1 and #2.
Once al the components and their respective functions have been listed it is 
time for the team to put on it’s colective “thinking cap” and, through 
brainstorming, come up with al the potential failure modes of the 
component—i.e., reasons it may not be able to perform its function(s).3) These are 
listed in column #3 of the form. It might be helpful to give the team members 
time to think about potential failure modes before holding the brainstorming 
session and have each member bring his/her ideas to that session. Classic 
techniques can be used for reducing the results of the brainstorming such as 
combining similar ideas, nominal group technique, and multivoting.4) 
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 2)　This definition is from the Automotive Industry Action Group’s (AIAG) Potential 
Failure Mode & Efects Analysis, 4th Edition, 2008. AIAG is a non-profit 
organization dedicated to improving quality in the automotive industry, primarily by 
publishing standards and ofering training.
 3)　It is possible that the component could have more than one function and al should 
be listed.
 4)　With the nominal group technique ideas are ranked with those receiving the highest
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Continuing with the McDermot et al. example, three failure modes were listed 
for the fire extinguisher hose: cracks, pinholes, and blockage; our example wil 
deal with the “cracks” failure mode only to ilustrate the process.
Next the team must identify al potential efects of each failure mode; these 
are listed in column #4 on the form. One way to think about efects is how the 
failure wil afect the customer. The McDermot et al. example listed “misfire” 
as the effect of the failure “cracks” (in the fire extinguisher hose). Again 
brainstorming is a good way to be sure al potential effects wil be listed. 
McDermot et al. suggest listing even questionable efects since, as the analysis 
continues, a determination of that efect’s likelihood of occurrence wil confirm 
whether or not it need be included.
At this point the team is ready to begin developing what is caled the Risk 
Priority Number (RPN), which wil go in column #11 of the form. This number 
is simply the product of estimates of each efect’s severity, likelihood of its failure 
mode/cause occuring, and likelihood of its failure mode/cause being detected.
The next step is for the team to judge the severity of each efect. To do this a 
rankin scheme should be developed such as shown in Appendix A. Appendix A, 
borrowed from Litle (2010), is for example purposes only and, according to 
McDermot et. al, such a ranking system “should be customized by the 
organization for use with al FMEAs” (p. 31). However, regardless of the 
descriptors, it is common practice to use a 10 to 1 scale with 10 being assigned 
to efects with the most sever consequences and 1 to efects with the least sever 
consequences.5) The number arrived at by the team is placed in column #5. Note 
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ranking selected. With multivoting, members are asked to pick the ideas they think 
best (usualy limited to about half of the total number of ideas) and the least preferred 
ideas are then dropped from the list. This continues until the number left is reasonably 
smal.
 5)　Note that this ranking scheme is a bit counterintuitive since one usualy associates →
the importance of this step in that it identifies potential failure modes that could 
result in death or serious injury that, in turn, could have disastrous consequences 
for the company. McDermot et. al’s imaginary team assigned a severity value 
of 10 for the “misfire” efect.
Besides severity, the team must develop an estimate of the likelihood of the 
failure mode/cause occurring and this number wil go into column #8. However 
to do this two other things must be done first: come up with the cause(s) of the 
failure (column #6) and see if there are any controls in place that might prevent 
the failure mode from occurring (column #7). The McDermot et. al example 
team determined that the cause of the “cracks” in the fire extinguisher 
hose—leading to the “misfire” efect—was “exposure to excessive heat or cold 
in shipping.”
Possible prevention controls are actions already being taken to prevent or 
minimize the failure and are taken into account when determining the 
“occurrence” value. Appendix B is just one example of a ranking chart for the 
occurrence rating. It shows how design history and application experience can 
be used to help arrive at an occurrence number. It also has a column with 
suggested analysis techniques that might also be used. Al this failing the team 
would simply use it best colective “engineering judgment” and a probability set 
as shown in the penultimate column of Appendix B.6) The McDermot et. al 
example, a very simple one, listed two current prevention controls: “insulated 
packaging materials” and “temperature controled shipping containers.” Again 
the 10 to 1 ranking system is used with 10 meaning it is very likely the failure 
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the larger numbers with some good trait so that a “high” score is beter; in this case it 
is worse! 
 6)　Note that in this particular example chart the penultimate column expresses 
“occurrence” in the “probability the design wil meet objectives.” Perhaps a beter 
heading would be “probability that the failure mode wil not occur.”
mode wil occur and 1 that it is very unlikely; in this case a 5 was assigned.
The next step in the FMEA process is to determine the likelihood the failure 
mode or cause wil be detected. As with occurrence, the team must first 
determine what controls exist to aid in detection and thus cause the detection 
rating to be reduced. It could be there are no controls in place and thus the 
rating would be a 10 meaning the problem wil not be detected before reaching 
the customer unless some action is taken. In our simple McDermot et. al 
example and for the “cracks” in the hose failure mode “None” was writen in 
this column. Despite this a “detection” ranking of 6 (vs. 10) was assigned and 
wil be used as we continue this example. To ilustrate this step the McDermot 
et. al example has another failure mode for the hose, “blockage,” for which two 
detection controls are cited: “incoming inspection” and “hose air passage test.” 
In any case any existing detection controls would be listed in column #9 of the 
FMEA form.
After taking any detection controls into account, the team wil decide on the 
likelihood of detection of the failure mode/cause and enter the number in column 
#10. Appendix C is an example from Litle (2010) of a detection-ranking chart. 
Although a litle dificult to understand, the chart atempts to show in its first 
column that the sooner a potential failure mode is detected in the development 
cycle the more likely it wil receive a low ranking. The second column provides 
descriptors for each ranking (e.g., for a ranking of 10, “Absolute Uncertainty of 
Detections”) and factors that might contribute to the ranking such as (for 10) 
“The issue can only be detected by the end user” (for some reason).
Completing the next column on the form, #11, is the easiest step in the 
FMEA process: determining the Risk Priority Number (RPN) for each efect. 
This step is only meaningful if al the prior steps have been carefuly carried 
out. As mentioned above, the RPN is simply the product of the severity, 
occurence, and detection (SOD) numbers.
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Perhaps the most important thing about the RPN is that it is only to show the 
relative importance of the diferent failure modes. Other than that, the actual 
number is meaningless. And that importance is in terms of the potential risk 
each failure mode—based on the effects associated with it—poses to the 
organization. In theory each effect could generate a RPN ranging from 0 to 
1000. For our simple McDermot et. al example, the RPN for the “cracks” 
failure mode was 300 as shown in Figure 1. In this example RPNs ranged from 
810 to 80.
The next step is to rank the failure modes according to their RPNs and decide 
which need the most atention in terms of remedial action. Figure 2 from Litle 
(2010) provides some general guidelines.
As indicated by the general guidance in Figure 2 the important thing is to 
focus on the severity of the effect when deciding which items are most 
important. Another important point is not to set some arbitrary cutof for the 
RPNs upon which action would be taken. This could lead to the team “gaming 
the system” to be sure only a few items (or only those not requiring much 
action) are actionable by this criterion. Instead al RPNs should be arrived at as 
objectively as possible using sincere engineering judgment. Here the team leader 
can play an important role.
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Figure 2.　General guidelines for taking action based on the RPN (from Litle, 2010, 
p. 30).
ActionRPN
Generaly no action is required. However, if severity of efect is high (>7),
a review of the S, O, and D rating may be advisable to ensure their validity.
<50
Action may or may not be required. Good engineering judgment must be
used to determine if action is necessary. Generaly action should be taken
for RPNs in this range when the severity of the efect is high (>7).
³50, <100
Generaly action should be taken for items with RPNs in this range.³100
For those failure modes deemed most important in terms of risk, the team must 
now decide on the remedial action to eliminate or at least reduce their efect. 
There seems to be some diference of opinion regarding whether the severity 
number can be reduced. According to Litle (p. 31), the “severity rating cannot be 
reduced” and Stamatis 2003) seems to agree saying: “The severity can be reduced 
only through a change in design” (p. 150). However McDermot et. al do provide 
some ways that severity can be reduced as shown in Figure 3. Figure 3 also 
suggest ways of reducing the other two RPN numbers, occurence and detection.
The information already gained by coming up with the potential cause(s) of 
the failure and existing prevention and detection controls wil likely suggest 
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 7)　This chart also includes actions that could apply to a process FMEA.
Figure 3.　Possible actions to reduce rankings (from McDermot et. al, 2009, p. 39).7)
appropriate action for each failure mode selected for further atention. 
Recommended actions are briefly writen in column #12 and the person 
responsible/target completion date for each action in column #13. Of course 
each action should generate a ful-fledged action plan. The actual action taken is 
briefly described in column #14 of the FMEA form.
The McDermot et. al team came up with the logical action of using a hose 
that is not temperature sensitive (see column #12 of Figure 1). Note that 
completion of an action may make a current control no longer necessary. In this 
case it would no longer be necessary to use the “insulated packaging” or 
“temperature controled shipping” prevention controls.
The next step in the FMEA process is for the team to decide on new rankings 
for the RPN numbers based on how the actions have changed things and then 
recalculate the RPN. These are placed in column #15, #16, and #17. The new 
RPN is writen in column #18.
At this point a decision has to be made as to whether the RPN now reflects 
an acceptable level of risk for the organization. In our simple McDermot et. al 
example the RPN has been reduced from 300 to 120 by the action taken to 
reduce the likelihood of the failure mode occurring from 5 to 2. Note that 
nothing could be done to reduce the severity and, apparently, the team could not 
come up with anything to increase the detection.
By this time the team may have enough knowledge about the product and 
how it wil be used to make a good judgment regarding if the RPN (i.e., risk) 
has been reduced suficiently and proceed accordingly (i.e., take further action 
to reduce the RPN or not take further action). On the other hand the team may 
decide to get management involved and, after presenting its findings, have 
management decide if the risk, as determined by the FMEA, is acceptable. If 
management decides the risk needs to be reduced further, the team wil continue 
working on the FMEA.
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In any event, once the FMEA is essentialy complete it wil be presented to 
management for final approval. However, it is important to realize that a FMEA 
is never realy complete since work on it may be necessary should the product 
be significantly changed (perhaps upgraded), a customer complaint reveals a 
previously unforeseen weakness in the product, or for any other reason where it 
is found there may be a change in the efect of any potential failure mode or a 
new mode is discovered. As seen on the Figure 1 form, there is a place at the 
botom for noting revision to the FMEA.
The process FMEA. The other most common FMEA is the process FMEA for 
analyzing a process, usualy one for manufacturing something but it could be for 
any process. The FMEA form for a process FMEA is essentialy the same 
except in this case the individual items on the form are the process steps instead 
of components. As quoted in Litle (2010, p. 14) a step is defined as “One level 
below the level of the manufacturing process for which the FMEA is being 
performed.” 8)
As with the design FMEA, a team would be assembled of appropriate experts 
including of course the involved process engineer or equivalent. To help the 
team understand the process and each step to be analyzed a detailed flowchart of 
the process should be produced9) and studied by the team to ensure each 
member has a good understanding of it. Then, using essentialy the same 
techniques as for the design FMEA, each process step is analyzed for potential 
failure modes; i.e., ways in which the step might fail to meet its intended 
purpose. Figure 4 is an example10) of how a step might be analyzed for potential 
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 8)　From the Automotive Industry Action Group’s (AIAG) Potential Failure Mode & 
Efects Analysis, 4th Edition, 2008. See also footnote 2.
 9)　This would probably be something done by the process engineer before the team’s 
first meeting. Although not for a manufacturing process, Appendix D provides an 
example of a flowchart.
10)　Adapted from an example found at “htp:/www.fmeainfocentre.com” under 
 
→
failure modes, in this case the application of wax to the inner door of a car 
being produced.
Note that this example is much more involved than the simple design FMEA 
example from McDermot et. al shown in Figure 1. This additional complexity 
could also occur with a design FMEA. Of interest in this more “complete” 
example are the folowing:
• The team has found more than one potential cause for the failure and, for 
each cause, occurrence and detection numbers have been estimated 
giving each cause its own RPN number and a candidate for possible 
remedial action.
• There may not be any existing prevention or detection controls for a 
cause. In Figure 4 two of the causes show “none” under prevention 
controls.
• Sometimes the team wil decide that it is not necessary to take any action 
on a cause such as is the case with the third cause in Figure 4. Recal 
Figure 2 provides general guidelines for when action should be taken 
based on the RPN. Although the severity for the third cause is 7 and 
borderline per Figure 2, the occurrence and detection numbers of 2 mean 
there is almost no chance the cause wil occur and, if it does, that it wil 
almost without a doubt be detected. Hence, the team deemed no action 
was necessary.
• More than one action may be recommended for a cause as shown for the 
first cause of Figure 4.
• When it comes to implementing a recommended action it may prove 
either infeasible or found to be not necessary (perhaps based on further 
information gained). This is ilustrated by the recommended action 
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“Examples” and then under “examplePFMEA.pdf.” Accessed October 1, 2010 (may 
have changed).
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“Automate spraying” for the first cause in Figure 4, which was “rejected 
due to complexity of diferent doors on the same line.”
• One measure that could be important for a process is that of its 
“capability,” Cpk. Cpk is a measure of how wel the process is centered 
with respect to the upper and lower specification limits. Generaly a 
value of about 2.0 is considered adequate. Figure 4 ilustrates the use of 
this measure in column #14, Action(s) Taken, for two of the four causes.
• Finaly, Figure 4 shows how actions can dramaticaly reduce the RPN 
and, hence, the risk of the failure; for example, the fourth cause’s RPN 
was reduced from 392 to 49 by instaling a spray timer making the 
occurence almost nil.
As with the design FMEA, an organization wil have appropriate ranking 
criteria for each element of the RPN—S, O, and D —to assess the risk of a 
potential process failure. Borrowing from Litle (2010) again, Appendix E 
shows example ranking criteria for these RPN elements for a process FMEA. 
Note again that such criteria should be appropriate to the organization and 
whatever serves it best for qualifying risk; Appendix E is meant only for 
example purposes.
2.　Other common FMEAs
The system FMEA. Although not as definitive as the design and process 
FMEAs there is something caled a system FMEA. Per Stamatis (2003):
A system FMEA (sometimes caled a concept FMEA) usualy is 
accomplished through a series of steps to include conceptual design, detail 
design and development, and test and evaluation (p. 107).
Although not that clear, from this one can infer that a system FMEA would 
be used in the early stages of the development of new product when the product 
is stil in the “conceptual” phase. It alows the testing, so to speak, of diferent 
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concepts for satisfying the customer’s needs. These concepts would be stated in 
terms of functions of a system. For example, if one were thinking of making a 
new cofeemaker, one function expressed in conceptual terms might be “is easy 
to use” and another “is economical” and so forth. As the design begins to take 
shape it would be tested against these concepts. Therefore, the form for a system 
FMEA would start with a list of system functions and then each function would 
be brainstormed for possible ways in which it might fail to meet that conceptual 
requirement. Each system function would also be a criterion against which the 
detailed design would be evaluated. In other words, the system FMEA can be 
considered looking at failure modes at one level above the design FMEA level.
The service FMEA. The use of the FMEA methodology would seem a natural 
for assessing a service function. A service FMEA is essentialy the same as a 
process FMEA except the process is one of providing some sort of service. 
Figure 5 shows a very simple example of how the first part of a service FMEA 
form might look for the service step of “Providing cash via ATM.” Just as with 
any FMEA, a service-oriented team would be established and look at each 
significant step in some service process and brainstorm any possible failure 
modes for that step. (As with a process FMEA, a flowchart of the service should 
be used so each significant step in the service process is identified.) Then the 
other usual columns on the FMEA form would be completed including any 
recommended actions to mitigate the risk by either eliminating the failure mode 
or minimizing its efects.
Conducting a service FMEA would certainly make sense for any “service” 
that involves life-threatening consequences should it not be correctly performed 
such as servicing the brakes on a car or providing appropriate medication to a 
hospital patient (see example of the later in the next section). However, it also 
would make sense any time an organization wishes to improve customer 
satisfaction. In this case the organization would be looking at ways a customer 
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might be annoyed by how he or she was treated in an encounter with an employee 
or even a machine (such as the third failure mode in the Figure 5 example).
3.　Some Innovative Applications of the FMEA proces
The idea of using the FMEA approach for assessing risk has found 
considerable general application, as the folowing examples wil show.
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Figure 5.　Service FMEA example (Adapted from an example found on the American 
Society for Quality [ASQ] Web site at htp:/asq.org/learn-about-
quality/process-analysis-tools/overview/fmea.html. ASQ notes that this 
example is “Excerpted from Nancy R. Tague’s The Quality Toolbox, Second 
Edition, ASQ Quality Press, 2004, pages 236–240.”)
For assessing outsourcing risk. Welborn (2007) leads us through an example 
from RadioShack that involved outsourcing the procurement of store fixtures such 
as shelving. The specific situation was a decision by RadioShack to switch to 
metal based fixtures versus the wood based fixtures it had been buying. It was 
determined that significant cost savings might be realized if Asian vendors were 
alowed to participate in the proposal process. As a result it was “decided to 
award the business to an Asian manufacturer.” However, “there was a concern 
about the risk of entering into a long-term relationship with a relatively unknown 
vendor not based in the United States” (p. 20). Accordingly it was decided to 
conduct a FMEA to assess the risk involved taking this decision and what might 
be done should the risk in any particular area be considered too great.
Figure 6 shows the major risk categories the FMEA team came up with: cost, 
lead time, and quality. Then each major category was broken down into more 
specific risk areas—also shown on Figure 6—such as under cost: unforeseen 
─ ─179
Robert B. Austenfeld, Jr.:　Failure Mode and Efects Analysis (FMEA)—A Primer
Figure 6.　Risk categories and evaluation criteria for outsourcing risk assessment (from 
Welborn, 2007, page 18).
vendor selection cost.
As shown on Figure 6, each specific risk area was then evaluated by 
consensus against three criteria: opportunity, probability, and severity using a 
1–5 scoring scale. Opportunity is the frequency with which the event is expected 
to occur from a one-time event (scored 1) to something that is a common 
occurrence (scored 5). Probability is the likelihood of the event actualy 
happening, again scored on a 1–5 basis. The combination of opportunity and 
probability would seem to equate to the “occurrence” factor in the traditional 
FMEA. There is no “detection” criterion, apparently due the team’s belief that 
al the risk events would be obvious. Finaly the degree of risk to operations is 
covered by the severity criterion—ranging from a score of 1 for a minimal 
impact on operations should the risk occur, to a score of 5 should the impact be 
deemed very significant.
As with the traditional FMEA, these three numbers are then multiplied to 
provide an RPN for each specific risk area and those judged the most serious 
addressed. For example it became obvious the most serious risk would probably 
be in “unforeseen management costs” because of the team’s belief that this risk 
area would not only occur frequently (opportunity score of 4) but would have a 
high likelihood of actualy happening (probability score of 4). Also its impact on 
operations would be fairly significant (severity score of 3). The team’s rational 
for this relatively high RPN was its concern “about the communication barrier 
and its ability to eficiently convey business transactions” (p. 20). To ofset this 
concern a smal team was established to work with the vendor “to manage 
business transactions such as communication of orders, schedules, payments, 
returns and repairs” (p. 21). Similar steps were taken with any of the other areas 
for which the risk was deemed too high.
From this case study it can be seen how one need not stick to any rigid set of 
criterion but rather adapt them to the situation at hand. Also the FMEA “form” 
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can be whatever best serves the team’s purpose for the task at hand. The idea is 
to come up with factors to be evaluated that best help evaluate the risk to the 
organization and wil reveal where improvement actions wil give the biggest 
risk-reduction payof.
For minimizing medical errors by optimizing the design of a new hospital. An 
article by Reiling et. al (2003) shows how FMEA can be applied to optimizing 
the design of a new hospital facility based on an overarching requirement to 
minimize the possibility of medical errors—in other words: what can we do in 
designing our new hospital that wil to enhance patient safety?
FMEA was used during the various stages of facility design from the layout 
of the hospital as a whole to the layout of individual rooms. For example in 
using the FMEA process to evaluate diferent ways the hospital could be laid 
out as a whole it was determined patient safety would be enhanced by 
separating the movement of materials such as food, pharmaceuticals, linen, and 
waste, from where the patients were. This was achieved by making the ground 
level of the hospital a nonpatient area for such service trafic.
FMEA was also used to identify potential “failures” that might be overcome 
related to how patients were transported between different departments. For 
example for the transfer of certain critical patients skiled personnel might be 
required causing short-stafing of important services—e.g., intensive care—at 
that time. Another failure might be unnecessarily long distances for the 
movement of “vulnerable, criticaly il patients.” “The proposed design plan 
evolved to minimize the occurrence and severity of [such] failures identified 
using FMEA” (p. 70).
Regarding individual room layout, “numerous FMEAs were conducted on 
alternative designs.” These were based, again, on patient safety and how to 
interface “a vulnerable patient with staf to minimize errors and maximize [a 
number of] facility design principles [such as] visibility of patients to staff; 
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immediate accessibility of information, close to the point of service; and patient 
involvement with care” (p. 70). As a result, the FMEA teams came up with 
several innovative room design features: e.g., “true standardization in room size 
and layout; in-room sink, alowing physician and staf hand washing in patient 
view; and charting alcove with window, increasing patient visibility for nurses, 
physicians and staf” (from a list on p. 70).
Finaly the FMEA process was applied to the “patient room and its 
components…” with a typical item being the cal buton and what the effect 
would be should this buton fail. Another example in this area raised by the 
application of FMEA was “Are al the fixed equipment outlets and switches in 
the right location if a vulnerable patient is in the room?” (p. 71).
It is interesting to note, as in the outsourcing case above, the FMEA form was 
tailored to meet the needs of this application—in this case it was greatly 
simplified. Figure 7 shows a sample form. In fact even the traditional numerical 
rating system was abandoned in favor of a “low, medium, or high” system. 
Apparently this was stil considered suficient to “indentify potential failures of 
design and their relative priority” (p. 69).
For preventing medical accidents. In another healthcare application Reiley 
(2002) proposes using FMEA to reduce operational medical errors. To ilustrate 
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Figure 7.　Sample FMEA form used in the design of a new hospital facility (from 
Reiling et. al, 2003, page 68).
his proposal he describes a fictitious FMEA team given the task of reducing 
medication errors in a hospital. Having flowcharted the process of medicating 
patients the team develops data on al the various reasons for the medication 
errors such as “order overlooked/forgoten,” “drug labeling error,” “staff 
education eror,” etc.
Then, folowing the FMEA process, each of these reasons is considered as a 
failure mode and possible efects are assigned. In this case, Reiley’s fictitious 
team comes up with this set of effects for the failure mode “order 
overlooked/forgoten”11):
• Non-critical (NC) ilness does not improve
• Non-critical (NC) ilness worsens
• Non-critical (NC) ilness becomes critical
• Critical ilness becomes fatal
Each efect is then assigned a “criticality score,” that is, an RPN based on the 
fictitious team’s judgment of its severity, occurrence, and chance of detection. 
Figure 8 casts this case in a traditional process FMEA format and shows how 
the criticality score (RPN) for each effect was calculated. A more complete 
treatment of this failure mode would take into consideration current prevention 
and detection controls. Of course once the criticality score for each effect is 
determined a judgment would be made as to what action(s), if any, should be 
recommended to mitigate the associated risk. Obviously the most atention 
would be given to the third and fourth effects: “non-critical ilness becomes 
critical” and “critical ilness becomes fatal.” Accordingly, Reiley’s imaginary 
FMEA team “recommended that orders and drug dosing for al patients with 
worsening or critical status at any time during an admission be reviewed on 
each shift by a hospital pharmacist.”
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11)　This set of efects could apply to al the medication failure modes.
For aiding preventive maintenance of equipment. Cotnareanu (1999) 
recommends applying the FMEA process to aid the preventive maintenance of 
equipment. To do this the traditional process FMEA form is modified to create 
an “equipment” FMEA form. Figure 9, excerpted from Cotnareanu’s article, 
shows how the form might be completed for two “equipments” that are parts of 
a “transfer unit machine.” The first column lists each major part (equipment) 
and its function of the machine for which the FMEA is being performed. Then, 
as with the traditional FMEA, the remaining columns on the form are completed 
by the team coming up with potential failure modes, potential effects of the 
failure, the severity of the effects, etc. until an RPN is determined for each 
machine part/equipment. As usual, the RPN wil serve as the basis on whether 
or not action needs to be taken—in this case to eliminate or minimize the risk 
due to the failure causing downtime of the machine. Note that instead of having 
separate columns for prevention and detection controls as shown on the 
traditional design or process FMEA form (Figures 1 and 4) al current controls 
are lumped into one column. Per Cotnareanu this is where the team would:
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CRITICALITY
SCORE
(RPN)
DET
D
OCC
O
SEV
S
EFFECTS OF
FAILURE
 FAILURE
MODE(S)
PROCESS STEP
FUNCTION(S)
PROCESS
STEP
189 79 3
NC ilness does
not improve
Order
overlooked/
forgoten
Provide corect
dosage at corect
time
Medicate
patient
270 59 6
NC ilness
worsens
324 49 9
NC ilness
becomes critical
90010910
Critical ilness
becomes fatal
etc.etc.etc.etc.
Other efectsOther failure
modes
Other process 
step functions
Other process
steps
Figure 8.　Example of an entry on a FMEA form for a FMEA to help prevent medical 
accidents (based on data from Reiley, 2002).
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“…list actions taken to shorten the duration of a breakdown (replacement 
parts inventory, for example), prevent the occurrence of an equipment 
breakdown (reducing frequency) and acquire early warning signals 
(detection) (p. 52).
In this example it is obvious the first part/equipment on the form, the main 
drive of the transfer unit, merits a lot of action since it’s RPN is quite high 
(400). Note that even though the severity of the item is not that high (5), its 
occurrence and detection ratings are, and these are the areas on which corrective 
action would focus.
Note also that this version of the FMEA is Revision (Rev.) A which serves to 
emphasize an important point Cotnareanu makes that the FMEA form is a living 
document and should be continuously reviewed for ways to make it beter in 
terms of reducing risk through continuous improvements.
As a project risk management tool. Carbone & Tippet (2004) have come up 
with an innovative way to use the FMEA process for the management of risk 
associated with a project. It can be used for any project or program and in 
conjunction with a regular FMEA should that be part of the project. This FMEA 
is caled a project risk FMEA abbreviated RFMEA.
Figure 10 shows how the regular FMEA format is modified for project risk 
management purposes. Now, instead of looking at failure modes for an 
individual component (the DFMEA) or process step (the PFMEA), “risk events” 
are identified by brainstorming by the project team. Risk events are expressed in 
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RPNDetectionSeverityOccurence
Failure
Mode
Failure ID
Typical FMEA
Columns
RPNDetectionRisk ScoreImpactLikelihoodRisk EventRisk ID
Typical RFMEA
Columns
Figure 10.　How the basic FMEA format is modified for a project risk FMEA (RFMEA) 
(from Carbone & Tippet, 2004, p. 30, Exhibit 1).
an “if such and such occurs, then this wil happen or be necessary” format. 
Although essentialy the same thing, occurrence and severity have been 
relabeled likelihood and impact to be more consistent with project management 
terminology. Using the 10 to 1 ranking scale, the likelihood of the risk event 
occurring can range from very likely to very unlikely. Similarly, values for the 
impact of the risk event can range from 10 to 1 based on schedule, cost, and 
technical12) factors. As seen in Figure 10 another dimension has been added to 
the analysis, a “risk score.” The risk score is the product of the likelihood and 
the impact values.
Detection is “the ability to detect the risk event with enough time to plan for 
a contingency and act upon the risk.” Values range from 1 or 2 if the “detection 
method is highly effective…” to 9 or 10 if “there is no detection method 
available or known that wil provide an alert with enough time to plan for a 
contingency” (p. 31, Exhibit 4).
Finaly the RPN is calculated in the usual way by multiplying likelihood, 
impact, and detection.
Once the team of experts has come up with al the potential risk events and a 
risk score and RPN for each event, the next step is to display these values in 
Pareto diagrams and determine risk score and RPN “critical values.”13) To make 
this clear the authors provide case study example where the team has indentified 
45 risk events. For ilustrative purposes Figure 11 shows the Pareto diagrams for 
14 of the 45 events. Each risk event is identified with a leter.
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12)　A “technical” factor is something that causes the scope of the project to change. 
Such a change could range from one that is “not noticeable” (value 1) to one that 
“renders end item unusable” (value 10).
13)　A critical value is subjectively determined by the team based on the Pareto displays 
that show the risk scores/RPNs in descending order (Figure 11). It is the team’s best 
judgment as to which risk events should be dealt with first relative to al the risk 
events.
From examination of these two diagrams, critical values of 20 and 125 were 
chosen for the risk score and RPN respectively.
The next step is to display the events on a scater plot on which the critical 
values have been used to divide the plot into four quadrants. This is shown in 
Figure 12 for the 14 sample events. As emphasized by the authors, the 
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Figure 12.　Example of scater plot of RPNs vs. risk scores showing critical values of 
125 for the RPNs and 20 for the risk scores. (from Carbone & Tippet, 2004, 
p. 34, Exhibit 10).
Figure 11.　Examples of Pareto diagrams for risk score and RPN values. (from Carbone 
& Tippet, 2004, p. 33, Exhibits 8 & 9).
important thing to note is that a high risk score does not necessarily mean a 
high RPN. Note that of the eight events that fal above the critical value of the 
risk score only four are above the critical value of the RPN. Furthermore, since 
the factor that separates the risk score from the RPN is the detection value this 
sort of display makes it apparent which risks are more affected by having a 
beter means for early detection: namely those in the upper right hand quadrant. 
The great benefit of this is the team can now spend its time on contingency 
response plans for these events (in the upper right hand quadrant) versus doing 
that for al eight of the events above the risk score critical value. Also it is these 
events that wil most benefit from enhancing their “detectability.”
Figure 13 wil give the reader a beter idea of how this RFMEA process 
works. G is one of the 45 risk events identified by the team in the example case 
study. Figure 13 shows the initialy assigned likelihood, impact, and detection 
values and the resultant risk score and RPN. Since this event fel in the upper 
right hand quadrant of the scater plot it became a prime candidate for 
development of a contingency response plan. By using generic test hardware the 
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RevisedContingency
Response Plan
Initial
Risk Event
Risk
ID RPNDRSILRPNDRSIL
183632Build generic test
hardware that could
be more easily
modified than
custom hardware.
25273694If hardware is not
valid then need to
redesign and
reorder with delay
of 12 weeks and
cost of over $100k.
G
etc.etc.
etc.etc.
Legend: L=Likelihood, I=Impact, RS=Risk Score, D=Detection
Figure 13.　Example of how a risk event might be evaluated both before and after a 
contingency response plan was made. (adapted from Carbone & Tippet, 
2004, from p. 33, Exhibit 7 and from information in the text of the article).
“…impact was reduced to less than a week of re-work.” Furthermore by coming 
up with “…a novel way of using generic boards to be able to prove out the 
hardware earlier the detection value was reduced to three” (p. 34). As can be 
seen from Figure 13 these contingency actions reduced the risk of this event to 
acceptable values of 6 for the risk score and 18 for the RPN.
The advantage of using a technique like RFMEA for quantifying project risk 
is it helps to isolate those events which are most serious due to the inability to 
detect them early enough to take timely action. That action might be to 
eficiently mitigate the risk or even take advantage of any opportunities early 
detection might reveal. This separation of the wheat from the chaf so to speak 
also helps concentrate the teams scarce resources on those risk most likely to 
cause problems.
4.　Summary and Conclusion
The purpose of the paper has been to provide a primer on FMEA by: 
describing the two most common versions—the design FMEA and the process 
FMEA, briefly discussing two other common FMEAs—the system FMEA and 
the service FMEA, and providing five examples of the innovative use of the 
FMEA process for other purposes. The later shows that with a litle imagination 
the FMEA concept can find very wide application as a risk management/reduction 
tool.
In conclusion, it is recommended that anyone involved in risk management 
consider the use of the FMEA as a possible way to systematicaly approach the 
problem. Here are some suggested additional sources for information on FMEA:
• The FMEA Info Centre (“Everything you want to know about Failure 
Mode and Efect Analysis”) at htp:/www.fmeainfocentre.com.
• FMEA and FMECA Information (“If you want to find out more about 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or Failure Mode, Effects, 
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and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), then you have come to the right 
place.”) at htp:/www.fmea-fmeca.com.
• The American Society of Quality (ASQ) at asq.org (search site using 
“FMEA”).
• The SAE14) standard Potential Failure Mode and Efects Analysis in 
Design (Design FMEA), Potential Failure Mode and Efects Analysis in 
Manufacturing and Assembly processes (Process FMEA) at 
htp:/standards.sae.org/j1739_200901.
• The Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG)15) publication Potential 
Failure Mode & Efects Analysis, 4th Edition, 2008. Per AIAG this “is a 
reference manual to be used by suppliers to Chrysler LLC, Ford Motor 
Company, and General Motors Corporation as a guide to assist them in 
the development of both Design and Process FMEAs.” Go to 
www.aiag.org and “Bookstore” under the “Products” dropdown menu. 
Then do a Product Search using “FMEA” and scrol down that page to 
this document.
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Appendix A
Example of a Ranking Scheme for Severity for a Design FMEA
(from Litle, 2010, Figure 1)
Note: This example is only to show how such a scheme might look; an actual 
scheme should be tailored to the needs of the organization and the FMEA 
being conducted.
Figure 1.　Suggested DFMEA Severity Evaluation Criteria.
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Appendix B
Example of a Ranking Scheme for Occurrence for a Design FMEA
(from Litle, 2010, Figure 2)
Note: This example is only to show how such a scheme might look; an actual 
scheme should be tailored to the needs of the organization and the FMEA 
being conducted.
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Appendix C
Example of a Ranking Scheme for Detection for a Design FMEA
(from Litle, 2010, Figure 3)
Note: This example is only to show how such a scheme might look; an actual 
scheme should be tailored to the needs of the organization and the FMEA 
being conducted.
Figure 3.　Suggested DFMEA Detection Evaluation Criteria.
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Appendix D (page 1 of 2)
Example of a Flowchart
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Appendix D (page 2 of 2)
Example of a Flowchart
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Appendix E (page 1 of 3)
Examples of a Ranking Schemes for a Process FMEA (PFMEA)
(from Litle, 2010, Figures 4, 5 & 6)
Note: These examples are only to show how such schemes might look; actual 
schemes should be tailored to the needs of the organization and the 
FMEA being conducted.
Figure 4.　Suggested PFMEA Severity Evaluation Criteria.
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Appendix E (page 2 of 3)
Examples of a Ranking Schemes for a Process FMEA (PFMEA)
(from Litle, 2010, Figures 4, 5 & 6)
Figure 5.　Suggested PFMEA Occurence Evaluation Criteria.
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Appendix E (page 3 of 3)
Examples of a Ranking Schemes for a Process FMEA (PFMEA)
(from Litle, 2010, Figures 4, 5 & 6)
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Appendix F
Slightly Enlarged Version of Figure 9 (Example of an Equipment/Preventive 
Maintenance FMEA) (for ease of reading)
(from Cotnareanu, 1999, p. 50)
